Merge tag 'for-6.15/block-20250322' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux

Pull block updates from Jens Axboe:

 - Fixes for integrity handling

 - NVMe pull request via Keith:
      - Secure concatenation for TCP transport (Hannes)
      - Multipath sysfs visibility (Nilay)
      - Various cleanups (Qasim, Baruch, Wang, Chen, Mike, Damien, Li)
      - Correct use of 64-bit BARs for pci-epf target (Niklas)
      - Socket fix for selinux when used in containers (Peijie)

 - MD pull request via Yu:
      - fix recovery can preempt resync (Li Nan)
      - fix md-bitmap IO limit (Su Yue)
      - fix raid10 discard with REQ_NOWAIT (Xiao Ni)
      - fix raid1 memory leak (Zheng Qixing)
      - fix mddev uaf (Yu Kuai)
      - fix raid1,raid10 IO flags (Yu Kuai)
      - some refactor and cleanup (Yu Kuai)

 - Series cleaning up and fixing bugs in the bad block handling code

 - Improve support for write failure simulation in null_blk

 - Various lock ordering fixes

 - Fixes for locking for debugfs attributes

 - Various ublk related fixes and improvements

 - Cleanups for blk-rq-qos wait handling

 - blk-throttle fixes

 - Fixes for loop dio and sync handling

 - Fixes and cleanups for the auto-PI code

 - Block side support for hardware encryption keys in blk-crypto

 - Various cleanups and fixes

* tag 'for-6.15/block-20250322' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: (105 commits)
  nvmet: replace max(a, min(b, c)) by clamp(val, lo, hi)
  nvme-tcp: fix selinux denied when calling sock_sendmsg
  nvmet: pci-epf: Always configure BAR0 as 64-bit
  nvmet: Remove duplicate uuid_copy
  nvme: zns: Simplify nvme_zone_parse_entry()
  nvmet: pci-epf: Remove redundant 'flush_workqueue()' calls
  nvmet-fc: Remove unused functions
  nvme-pci: remove stale comment
  nvme-fc: Utilise min3() to simplify queue count calculation
  nvme-multipath: Add visibility for queue-depth io-policy
  nvme-multipath: Add visibility for numa io-policy
  nvme-multipath: Add visibility for round-robin io-policy
  nvmet: add tls_concat and tls_key debugfs entries
  nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation
  nvmet: Add 'sq' argument to alloc_ctrl_args
  nvme-fabrics: reset admin connection for secure concatenation
  nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation
  nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh()
  nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk()
  nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest()
  ...
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2025-03-26 18:08:55 -07:00
128 changed files with 4069 additions and 1571 deletions

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config FS_ENCRYPTION
bool "FS Encryption (Per-file encryption)"
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_HASH
select CRYPTO_HKDF
select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
select KEYS

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Implementation of HKDF ("HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation
* Function"), aka RFC 5869. See also the original paper (Krawczyk 2010):
* "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme".
*
* This is used to derive keys from the fscrypt master keys.
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
@@ -11,6 +7,7 @@
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <crypto/hkdf.h>
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
@@ -44,20 +41,6 @@
* there's no way to persist a random salt per master key from kernel mode.
*/
/* HKDF-Extract (RFC 5869 section 2.2), unsalted */
static int hkdf_extract(struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm, const u8 *ikm,
unsigned int ikmlen, u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN])
{
static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN];
int err;
err = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN);
if (err)
return err;
return crypto_shash_tfm_digest(hmac_tfm, ikm, ikmlen, prk);
}
/*
* Compute HKDF-Extract using the given master key as the input keying material,
* and prepare an HMAC transform object keyed by the resulting pseudorandom key.
@@ -69,6 +52,7 @@ int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
unsigned int master_key_size)
{
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
static const u8 default_salt[HKDF_HASHLEN];
u8 prk[HKDF_HASHLEN];
int err;
@@ -84,7 +68,8 @@ int fscrypt_init_hkdf(struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, const u8 *master_key,
goto err_free_tfm;
}
err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_key, master_key_size, prk);
err = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, master_key, master_key_size,
default_salt, HKDF_HASHLEN, prk);
if (err)
goto err_free_tfm;
@@ -118,61 +103,21 @@ int fscrypt_hkdf_expand(const struct fscrypt_hkdf *hkdf, u8 context,
u8 *okm, unsigned int okmlen)
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, hkdf->hmac_tfm);
u8 prefix[9];
unsigned int i;
u8 *full_info;
int err;
const u8 *prev = NULL;
u8 counter = 1;
u8 tmp[HKDF_HASHLEN];
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(okmlen > 255 * HKDF_HASHLEN))
return -EINVAL;
full_info = kzalloc(infolen + 9, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!full_info)
return -ENOMEM;
desc->tfm = hkdf->hmac_tfm;
memcpy(prefix, "fscrypt\0", 8);
prefix[8] = context;
memcpy(full_info, "fscrypt\0", 8);
full_info[8] = context;
memcpy(full_info + 9, info, infolen);
for (i = 0; i < okmlen; i += HKDF_HASHLEN) {
err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (err)
goto out;
if (prev) {
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prev, HKDF_HASHLEN);
if (err)
goto out;
}
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, prefix, sizeof(prefix));
if (err)
goto out;
err = crypto_shash_update(desc, info, infolen);
if (err)
goto out;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(counter) != 1);
if (okmlen - i < HKDF_HASHLEN) {
err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, tmp);
if (err)
goto out;
memcpy(&okm[i], tmp, okmlen - i);
memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
} else {
err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, &counter, 1, &okm[i]);
if (err)
goto out;
}
counter++;
prev = &okm[i];
}
err = 0;
out:
if (unlikely(err))
memzero_explicit(okm, okmlen); /* so caller doesn't need to */
shash_desc_zero(desc);
err = hkdf_expand(hkdf->hmac_tfm, full_info, infolen + 9,
okm, okmlen);
kfree_sensitive(full_info);
return err;
}

View File

@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = ci->ci_mode->blk_crypto_mode;
crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = 1U << ci->ci_data_unit_bits;
crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci);
crypto_cfg.key_type = BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW;
devs = fscrypt_get_devices(sb, &num_devs);
if (IS_ERR(devs))
@@ -166,7 +167,8 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
if (!blk_key)
return -ENOMEM;
err = blk_crypto_init_key(blk_key, raw_key, crypto_mode,
err = blk_crypto_init_key(blk_key, raw_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize,
BLK_CRYPTO_KEY_TYPE_RAW, crypto_mode,
fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci),
1U << ci->ci_data_unit_bits);
if (err) {