virt: sev-guest: Satisfy linear mapping requirement in get_derived_key()

Commit

  7ffeb2fc26 ("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers")

added a check that requires the guest request buffers to be in the linear
mapping. The get_derived_key() function was passing a buffer that was
allocated on the stack, resulting in the call to snp_send_guest_request()
returning an error.

Update the get_derived_key() function to use an allocated buffer instead
of a stack buffer.

Fixes: 7ffeb2fc26 ("x86/sev: Document requirement for linear mapping of guest request buffers")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/9b764ca9fc79199a091aac684c4926e2080ca7a8.1752698495.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
This commit is contained in:
Tom Lendacky
2025-07-16 15:41:35 -05:00
committed by Borislav Petkov (AMD)
parent 5eb1bcdb6a
commit c08ba63078

View File

@@ -116,13 +116,11 @@ e_free:
static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
{
struct snp_derived_key_resp *derived_key_resp __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct snp_derived_key_req *derived_key_req __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct snp_derived_key_resp derived_key_resp = {0};
struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc = snp_dev->msg_desc;
struct snp_guest_req req = {};
int rc, resp_len;
/* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */
u8 buf[64 + 16];
if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -132,8 +130,9 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque
* response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
* authtag.
*/
resp_len = sizeof(derived_key_resp.data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize;
if (sizeof(buf) < resp_len)
resp_len = sizeof(derived_key_resp->data) + mdesc->ctx->authsize;
derived_key_resp = kzalloc(resp_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!derived_key_resp)
return -ENOMEM;
derived_key_req = kzalloc(sizeof(*derived_key_req), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
@@ -149,23 +148,21 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque
req.vmpck_id = mdesc->vmpck_id;
req.req_buf = derived_key_req;
req.req_sz = sizeof(*derived_key_req);
req.resp_buf = buf;
req.resp_buf = derived_key_resp;
req.resp_sz = resp_len;
req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req);
arg->exitinfo2 = req.exitinfo2;
if (rc)
return rc;
memcpy(derived_key_resp.data, buf, sizeof(derived_key_resp.data));
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, &derived_key_resp,
sizeof(derived_key_resp)))
rc = -EFAULT;
if (!rc) {
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, derived_key_resp,
sizeof(derived_key_resp->data)))
rc = -EFAULT;
}
/* The response buffer contains the sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */
memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
memzero_explicit(&derived_key_resp, sizeof(derived_key_resp));
memzero_explicit(derived_key_resp, sizeof(*derived_key_resp));
return rc;
}