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mm: security: Move hardened usercopy under 'Kernel hardening options'
There is a submenu for 'Kernel hardening options' under "Security". Move HARDENED_USERCOPY under the hardening options as it is clearly related. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123221115.19722-2-mgorman@techsingularity.net Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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@@ -164,18 +164,6 @@ config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
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this low address space will need the permission specific to the
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systems running LSM.
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config HARDENED_USERCOPY
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bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
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imply STRICT_DEVMEM
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help
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This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
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copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
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copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
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are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
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separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
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or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
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of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
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config FORTIFY_SOURCE
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bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
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depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
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