Old microcode is bad for users and for kernel developers.
For users, it exposes them to known fixed security and/or functional
issues. These obviously rarely result in instant dumpster fires in
every environment. But it is as important to keep your microcode up
to date as it is to keep your kernel up to date.
Old microcode also makes kernels harder to debug. A developer looking
at an oops need to consider kernel bugs, known CPU issues and unknown
CPU issues as possible causes. If they know the microcode is up to
date, they can mostly eliminate known CPU issues as the cause.
Make it easier to tell if CPU microcode is out of date. Add a list
of released microcode. If the loaded microcode is older than the
release, tell users in a place that folks can find it:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/old_microcode
Tell kernel kernel developers about it with the existing taint
flag:
TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
== Discussion ==
When a user reports a potential kernel issue, it is very common
to ask them to reproduce the issue on mainline. Running mainline,
they will (independently from the distro) acquire a more up-to-date
microcode version list. If their microcode is old, they will
get a warning about the taint and kernel developers can take that
into consideration when debugging.
Just like any other entry in "vulnerabilities/", users are free to
make their own assessment of their exposure.
== Microcode Revision Discussion ==
The microcode versions in the table were generated from the Intel
microcode git repo:
8ac9378a8487 ("microcode-20241112 Release")
which as of this writing lags behind the latest microcode-20250211.
It can be argued that the versions that the kernel picks to call "old"
should be a revision or two old. Which specific version is picked is
less important to me than picking *a* version and enforcing it.
This repository contains only microcode versions that Intel has deemed
to be OS-loadable. It is quite possible that the BIOS has loaded a
newer microcode than the latest in this repo. If this happens, the
system is considered to have new microcode, not old.
Specifically, the sysfs file and taint flag answer the question:
Is the CPU running on the latest OS-loadable microcode,
or something even later that the BIOS loaded?
In other words, Intel never publishes an authoritative list of CPUs
and latest microcode revisions. Until it does, this is the best that
Linux can do.
Also note that the "intel-ucode-defs.h" file is simple, ugly and
has lots of magic numbers. That's on purpose and should allow a
single file to be shared across lots of stable kernel regardless of if
they have the new "VFM" infrastructure or not. It was generated with
a dumb script.
== FAQ ==
Q: Does this tell me if my system is secure or insecure?
A: No. It only tells you if your microcode was old when the
system booted.
Q: Should the kernel warn if the microcode list itself is too old?
A: No. New kernels will get new microcode lists, both mainline
and stable. The only way to have an old list is to be running
an old kernel in which case you have bigger problems.
Q: Is this for security or functional issues?
A: Both.
Q: If a given microcode update only has functional problems but
no security issues, will it be considered old?
A: Yes. All microcode image versions within a microcode release
are treated identically. Intel appears to make security
updates without disclosing them in the release notes. Thus,
all updates are considered to be security-relevant.
Q: Who runs old microcode?
A: Anybody with an old distro. This happens all the time inside
of Intel where there are lots of weird systems in labs that
might not be getting regular distro updates and might also
be running rather exotic microcode images.
Q: If I update my microcode after booting will it stop saying
"Vulnerable"?
A: No. Just like all the other vulnerabilies, you need to
reboot before the kernel will reassess your vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwi@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250421195659.CF426C07%40davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com
(cherry picked from commit 9127865b15eb0a1bd05ad7efe29489c44394bdc1)
If a core is offline then enabling SMT should not online CPUs of
this core. By enabling SMT, what is intended is either changing the SMT
value from "off" to "on" or setting the SMT level (threads per core) from a
lower to higher value.
On PowerPC the ppc64_cpu utility can be used, among other things, to
perform the following functions:
ppc64_cpu --cores-on # Get the number of online cores
ppc64_cpu --cores-on=X # Put exactly X cores online
ppc64_cpu --offline-cores=X[,Y,...] # Put specified cores offline
ppc64_cpu --smt={on|off|value} # Enable, disable or change SMT level
If the user has decided to offline certain cores, enabling SMT should
not online CPUs in those cores. This patch fixes the issue and changes
the behaviour as described, by introducing an arch specific function
topology_is_core_online(). It is currently implemented only for PowerPC.
Fixes: 73c58e7e14 ("powerpc: Add HOTPLUG_SMT support")
Reported-by: Tyrel Datwyler <tyreld@linux.ibm.com>
Closes: https://groups.google.com/g/powerpc-utils-devel/c/wrwVzAAnRlI/m/5KJSoqP4BAAJ
Signed-off-by: Nysal Jan K.A <nysal@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20240731030126.956210-2-nysal@linux.ibm.com
Pull x86 SEV updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add support for running the kernel in a SEV-SNP guest, over a Secure
VM Service Module (SVSM).
When running over a SVSM, different services can run at different
protection levels, apart from the guest OS but still within the
secure SNP environment. They can provide services to the guest, like
a vTPM, for example.
This series adds the required facilities to interface with such a
SVSM module.
- The usual fixlets, refactoring and cleanups
[ And as always: "SEV" is AMD's "Secure Encrypted Virtualization".
I can't be the only one who gets all the newer x86 TLA's confused,
can I?
- Linus ]
* tag 'x86_sev_for_v6.11_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Documentation/ABI/configfs-tsm: Fix an unexpected indentation silly
x86/sev: Do RMP memory coverage check after max_pfn has been set
x86/sev: Move SEV compilation units
virt: sev-guest: Mark driver struct with __refdata to prevent section mismatch
x86/sev: Allow non-VMPL0 execution when an SVSM is present
x86/sev: Extend the config-fs attestation support for an SVSM
x86/sev: Take advantage of configfs visibility support in TSM
fs/configfs: Add a callback to determine attribute visibility
sev-guest: configfs-tsm: Allow the privlevel_floor attribute to be updated
virt: sev-guest: Choose the VMPCK key based on executing VMPL
x86/sev: Provide guest VMPL level to userspace
x86/sev: Provide SVSM discovery support
x86/sev: Use the SVSM to create a vCPU when not in VMPL0
x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not at VMPL0
x86/sev: Use kernel provided SVSM Calling Areas
x86/sev: Check for the presence of an SVSM in the SNP secrets page
x86/irqflags: Provide native versions of the local_irq_save()/restore()
The 'offline' file in sysfs shows all offline CPUs, including those
that aren't present. User-space is expected to remove not-present CPUs
from this list to learn which CPUs could be brought online.
CPUs can be present but not-enabled. These CPUs can't be brought online
until the firmware policy changes, which comes with an ACPI notification
that will register the CPUs.
With only the offline and present files, user-space is unable to
determine which CPUs it can try to bring online. Add a new CPU mask
that shows this based on all the registered CPUs.
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Tested-by: Miguel Luis <miguel.luis@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Vishnu Pajjuri <vishnu@os.amperecomputing.com>
Tested-by: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240529133446.28446-20-Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Requesting an attestation report from userspace involves providing the VMPL
level for the report. Currently any value from 0-3 is valid because Linux
enforces running at VMPL0.
When an SVSM is present, though, Linux will not be running at VMPL0 and only
VMPL values starting at the VMPL level Linux is running at to 3 are valid. In
order to allow userspace to determine the minimum VMPL value that can be
supplied to an attestation report, create a sysfs entry that can be used to
retrieve the current VMPL level of the kernel.
[ bp: Add CONFIG_SYSFS ifdeffery. ]
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fff846da0d8d561f9fdaf297dcf8cd907545a25b.1717600736.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
RFDS is a CPU vulnerability that may allow userspace to infer kernel
stale data previously used in floating point registers, vector registers
and integer registers. RFDS only affects certain Intel Atom processors.
Intel released a microcode update that uses VERW instruction to clear
the affected CPU buffers. Unlike MDS, none of the affected cores support
SMT.
Add RFDS bug infrastructure and enable the VERW based mitigation by
default, that clears the affected buffers just before exiting to
userspace. Also add sysfs reporting and cmdline parameter
"reg_file_data_sampling" to control the mitigation.
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- An extensive rework of kexec and crash Kconfig from Eric DeVolder
("refactor Kconfig to consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options")
- kernel.h slimming work from Andy Shevchenko ("kernel.h: Split out a
couple of macros to args.h")
- gdb feature work from Kuan-Ying Lee ("Add GDB memory helper
commands")
- vsprintf inclusion rationalization from Andy Shevchenko
("lib/vsprintf: Rework header inclusions")
- Switch the handling of kdump from a udev scheme to in-kernel
handling, by Eric DeVolder ("crash: Kernel handling of CPU and memory
hot un/plug")
- Many singleton patches to various parts of the tree
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-08-28-22-48' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (81 commits)
document while_each_thread(), change first_tid() to use for_each_thread()
drivers/char/mem.c: shrink character device's devlist[] array
x86/crash: optimize CPU changes
crash: change crash_prepare_elf64_headers() to for_each_possible_cpu()
crash: hotplug support for kexec_load()
x86/crash: add x86 crash hotplug support
crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes
kexec: exclude elfcorehdr from the segment digest
crash: add generic infrastructure for crash hotplug support
crash: move a few code bits to setup support of crash hotplug
kstrtox: consistently use _tolower()
kill do_each_thread()
nilfs2: fix WARNING in mark_buffer_dirty due to discarded buffer reuse
scripts/bloat-o-meter: count weak symbol sizes
treewide: drop CONFIG_EMBEDDED
lockdep: fix static memory detection even more
lib/vsprintf: declare no_hash_pointers in sprintf.h
lib/vsprintf: split out sprintf() and friends
kernel/fork: stop playing lockless games for exe_file replacement
adfs: delete unused "union adfs_dirtail" definition
...
Pull CPU hotplug updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Updates for the CPU hotplug core:
- Support partial SMT enablement.
So far the sysfs SMT control only allows to toggle between SMT on
and off. That's sufficient for x86 which usually has at max two
threads except for the Xeon PHI platform which has four threads per
core
Though PowerPC has up to 16 threads per core and so far it's only
possible to control the number of enabled threads per core via a
command line option. There is some way to control this at runtime,
but that lacks enforcement and the usability is awkward
This update expands the sysfs interface and the core infrastructure
to accept numerical values so PowerPC can build SMT runtime control
for partial SMT enablement on top
The core support has also been provided to the PowerPC maintainers
who added the PowerPC related changes on top
- Minor cleanups and documentation updates"
* tag 'smp-core-2023-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
Documentation: core-api/cpuhotplug: Fix state names
cpu/hotplug: Remove unused function declaration cpu_set_state_online()
cpu/SMT: Fix cpu_smt_possible() comment
cpu/SMT: Allow enabling partial SMT states via sysfs
cpu/SMT: Create topology_smt_thread_allowed()
cpu/SMT: Remove topology_smt_supported()
cpu/SMT: Store the current/max number of threads
cpu/SMT: Move smt/control simple exit cases earlier
cpu/SMT: Move SMT prototypes into cpu_smt.h
cpu/hotplug: Remove dependancy against cpu_primary_thread_mask
Introduce the crash_hotplug attribute for memory and CPUs for use by
userspace. These attributes directly facilitate the udev rule for
managing userspace re-loading of the crash kernel upon hot un/plug
changes.
For memory, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the
/sys/devices/system/memory directory. For example:
# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/memory/memory81
looking at device '/devices/system/memory/memory81':
KERNEL=="memory81"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory"
DRIVER==""
ATTR{online}=="1"
ATTR{phys_device}=="0"
ATTR{phys_index}=="00000051"
ATTR{removable}=="1"
ATTR{state}=="online"
ATTR{valid_zones}=="Movable"
looking at parent device '/devices/system/memory':
KERNELS=="memory"
SUBSYSTEMS==""
DRIVERS==""
ATTRS{auto_online_blocks}=="offline"
ATTRS{block_size_bytes}=="8000000"
ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1"
For CPUs, expose the crash_hotplug attribute to the
/sys/devices/system/cpu directory. For example:
# udevadm info --attribute-walk /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0
looking at device '/devices/system/cpu/cpu0':
KERNEL=="cpu0"
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu"
DRIVER=="processor"
ATTR{crash_notes}=="277c38600"
ATTR{crash_notes_size}=="368"
ATTR{online}=="1"
looking at parent device '/devices/system/cpu':
KERNELS=="cpu"
SUBSYSTEMS==""
DRIVERS==""
ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1"
ATTRS{isolated}==""
ATTRS{kernel_max}=="8191"
ATTRS{nohz_full}==" (null)"
ATTRS{offline}=="4-7"
ATTRS{online}=="0-3"
ATTRS{possible}=="0-7"
ATTRS{present}=="0-3"
With these sysfs attributes in place, it is possible to efficiently
instruct the udev rule to skip crash kernel reloading for kernels
configured with crash hotplug support.
For example, the following is the proposed udev rule change for RHEL
system 98-kexec.rules (as the first lines of the rule file):
# The kernel updates the crash elfcorehdr for CPU and memory changes
SUBSYSTEM=="cpu", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
SUBSYSTEM=="memory", ATTRS{crash_hotplug}=="1", GOTO="kdump_reload_end"
When examined in the context of 98-kexec.rules, the above rules test if
crash_hotplug is set, and if so, the userspace initiated
unload-then-reload of the crash kernel is skipped.
CPU and memory checks are separated in accordance with CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
and CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG kernel config options. If an architecture
supports, for example, memory hotplug but not CPU hotplug, then the
/sys/devices/system/memory/crash_hotplug attribute file is present, but
the /sys/devices/system/cpu/crash_hotplug attribute file will NOT be
present. Thus the udev rule skips userspace processing of memory hot
un/plug events, but the udev rule will evaluate false for CPU events, thus
allowing userspace to process CPU hot un/plug events (ie the
unload-then-reload of the kdump capture kernel).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230814214446.6659-5-eric.devolder@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Akhil Raj <lf32.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Add support to the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control interface for
enabling a specified number of SMT threads per core, including partial
SMT states where not all threads are brought online.
The current interface accepts "on" and "off", to enable either 1 or all
SMT threads per core.
This commit allows writing an integer, between 1 and the number of SMT
threads supported by the machine. Writing 1 is a synonym for "off", 2 or
more enables SMT with the specified number of threads.
When reading the file, if all threads are online "on" is returned, to
avoid changing behaviour for existing users. If some other number of
threads is online then the integer value is returned.
Architectures like x86 only supporting 1 thread or all threads, should not
define CONFIG_SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC. Architecture supporting partial SMT
states, like PowerPC, should define it.
[ ldufour: Slightly reword the commit's description ]
[ ldufour: Remove switch() in __store_smt_control() ]
[ ldufour: Rix build issue in control_show() ]
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230705145143.40545-8-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
vector registers.
Intel processors that support AVX2 and AVX512 have gather instructions
that fetch non-contiguous data elements from memory. On vulnerable
hardware, when a gather instruction is transiently executed and
encounters a fault, stale data from architectural or internal vector
registers may get transiently stored to the destination vector
register allowing an attacker to infer the stale data using typical
side channel techniques like cache timing attacks.
This mitigation is different from many earlier ones for two reasons.
First, it is enabled by default and a bit must be set to *DISABLE* it.
This is the opposite of normal mitigation polarity. This means GDS can
be mitigated simply by updating microcode and leaving the new control
bit alone.
Second, GDS has a "lock" bit. This lock bit is there because the
mitigation affects the hardware security features KeyLocker and SGX.
It needs to be enabled and *STAY* enabled for these features to be
mitigated against GDS.
The mitigation is enabled in the microcode by default. Disable it by
setting gather_data_sampling=off or by disabling all mitigations with
mitigations=off. The mitigation status can be checked by reading:
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/gather_data_sampling
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Architecture-specific documentation is being moved into Documentation/arch/
as a way of cleaning up the top-level documentation directory and making
the docs hierarchy more closely match the source hierarchy. Move
Documentation/arm64 into arch/ (along with the Chinese equvalent
translations) and fix up documentation references.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Shi <alexs@kernel.org>
Cc: Hu Haowen <src.res@email.cn>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yantengsi <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"There's not a huge amount of activity in the docs tree this time
around, but a few significant changes even so:
- A complete rewriting of the top-level index.rst file, which mostly
reflects itself in a redone top page in the HTML-rendered docs. The
hope is that the new organization will be a friendlier starting
point for both users and developers.
- Some math-rendering improvements.
- A coding-style.rst update on the use of BUG() and WARN()
- A big maintainer-PHP guide update.
- Some code-of-conduct updates
- More Chinese translation work
Plus the usual pile of typo fixes, corrections, and updates"
* tag 'docs-6.1' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (66 commits)
checkpatch: warn on usage of VM_BUG_ON() and other BUG variants
coding-style.rst: document BUG() and WARN() rules ("do not crash the kernel")
Documentation: devres: add missing IO helper
Documentation: devres: update IRQ helper
Documentation/mm: modify page_referenced to folio_referenced
Documentation/CoC: Reflect current CoC interpretation and practices
docs/doc-guide: Add documentation on SPHINX_IMGMATH
docs: process/5.Posting.rst: clarify use of Reported-by: tag
docs, kprobes: Fix the wrong location of Kprobes
docs: add a man-pages link to the front page
docs: put atomic*.txt and memory-barriers.txt into the core-api book
docs: move asm-annotations.rst into core-api
docs: remove some index.rst cruft
docs: reconfigure the HTML left column
docs: Rewrite the front page
docs: promote the title of process/index.rst
Documentation: devres: add missing SPI helper
Documentation: devres: add missing PINCTRL helpers
docs: hugetlbpage.rst: fix a typo of hugepage size
docs/zh_CN: Add new translation of admin-guide/bootconfig.rst
...
While reporting for the AMD retbleed vulnerability was added in
6b80b59b35 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
the new sysfs file was not mentioned so far in the ABI documentation for
sysfs-devices-system-cpu. Fix that.
Fixes: 6b80b59b35 ("x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801091529.325327-1-carnil@debian.org
Pull driver core / kernfs updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the set of driver core and kernfs changes for 6.0-rc1.
The "biggest" thing in here is some scalability improvements for
kernfs for large systems. Other than that, included in here are:
- arch topology and cache info changes that have been reviewed and
discussed a lot.
- potential error path cleanup fixes
- deferred driver probe cleanups
- firmware loader cleanups and tweaks
- documentation updates
- other small things
All of these have been in the linux-next tree for a while with no
reported problems"
* tag 'driver-core-6.0-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (63 commits)
docs: embargoed-hardware-issues: fix invalid AMD contact email
firmware_loader: Replace kmap() with kmap_local_page()
sysfs docs: ABI: Fix typo in comment
kobject: fix Kconfig.debug "its" grammar
kernfs: Fix typo 'the the' in comment
docs: driver-api: firmware: add driver firmware guidelines. (v3)
arch_topology: Fix cache attributes detection in the CPU hotplug path
ACPI: PPTT: Leave the table mapped for the runtime usage
cacheinfo: Use atomic allocation for percpu cache attributes
drivers/base: fix userspace break from using bin_attributes for cpumap and cpulist
MAINTAINERS: Change mentions of mpm to olivia
docs: ABI: sysfs-devices-soc: Update Lee Jones' email address
docs: ABI: sysfs-class-pwm: Update Lee Jones' email address
Documentation/process: Add embargoed HW contact for LLVM
Revert "kernfs: Change kernfs_notify_list to llist."
ACPI: Remove the unused find_acpi_cpu_cache_topology()
arch_topology: Warn that topology for nested clusters is not supported
arch_topology: Add support for parsing sockets in /cpu-map
arch_topology: Set cluster identifier in each core/thread from /cpu-map
arch_topology: Limit span of cpu_clustergroup_mask()
...
We currently expose MIDR and REVID to userspace through sysfs to enable it
to make decisions based on the specific implementation. Since SME supports
implementations where streaming mode is provided by a separate hardware
unit called a SMCU it provides a similar ID register SMIDR. Expose it to
userspace via sysfs when the system supports SME along with the other ID
registers.
Since we disable the SME priority mapping feature if it is supported by
hardware we currently mask out the SMPS bit which reports that it is
supported.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220607132857.1358361-1-broonie@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Add the sysfs reporting file for Processor MMIO Stale Data
vulnerability. It exposes the vulnerability and mitigation state similar
to the existing files for the other hardware vulnerabilities.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Pull x86 cpu feature updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Merge the AMD and Intel PPIN code into a shared one by both vendors.
Add the PPIN number to sysfs so that sockets can be identified when
replacement is needed
- Minor fixes and cleanups
* tag 'x86_cpu_for_v5.18_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Clear SME feature flag when not in use
x86/cpufeatures: Put the AMX macros in the word 18 block
topology/sysfs: Add PPIN in sysfs under cpu topology
topology/sysfs: Add format parameter to macro defining "show" functions for proc
x86/cpu: Read/save PPIN MSR during initialization
x86/cpu: X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN finally has a CPUID bit
x86/cpu: Merge Intel and AMD ppin_init() functions
x86/CPU/AMD: Use default_groups in kobj_type
PPIN is the Protected Processor Identification Number.
This is used to identify the socket as a Field Replaceable Unit (FRU).
Existing code only displays this when reporting errors. But this makes
it inconvenient for large clusters to use it for its intended purpose
of inventory control.
Add ppin to /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu*/topology to make what
is already available using RDMSR more easily accessible. Make
the file read only for root in case there are still people
concerned about making a unique system "serial number" available.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131230111.2004669-6-tony.luck@intel.com
* tip/sched/arm64: (785 commits)
Documentation: arm64: describe asymmetric 32-bit support
arm64: Remove logic to kill 32-bit tasks on 64-bit-only cores
arm64: Hook up cmdline parameter to allow mismatched 32-bit EL0
arm64: Advertise CPUs capable of running 32-bit applications in sysfs
arm64: Prevent offlining first CPU with 32-bit EL0 on mismatched system
arm64: exec: Adjust affinity for compat tasks with mismatched 32-bit EL0
arm64: Implement task_cpu_possible_mask()
sched: Introduce dl_task_check_affinity() to check proposed affinity
sched: Allow task CPU affinity to be restricted on asymmetric systems
sched: Split the guts of sched_setaffinity() into a helper function
sched: Introduce task_struct::user_cpus_ptr to track requested affinity
sched: Reject CPU affinity changes based on task_cpu_possible_mask()
cpuset: Cleanup cpuset_cpus_allowed_fallback() use in select_fallback_rq()
cpuset: Honour task_cpu_possible_mask() in guarantee_online_cpus()
cpuset: Don't use the cpu_possible_mask as a last resort for cgroup v1
sched: Introduce task_cpu_possible_mask() to limit fallback rq selection
sched: Cgroup SCHED_IDLE support
sched/topology: Skip updating masks for non-online nodes
Linux 5.14-rc6
lib: use PFN_PHYS() in devmem_is_allowed()
...
Fix the following typos in the Documentation/ABI/ directory:
- In file obsolete/sysfs-cpuidle, change "obselete" for "obsolete".
- In file removed/sysfs-kernel-uids, change "propotional" for "proportional".
- In directory stable/, fix the following words: "associtated" for "associated",
"hexidecimal" for "hexadecimal", "vlue" for "value", "csed" for "caused" and
"wrtie" for "write". This updates a total of five files.
- In directory testing/, fix the following words: "subystem" for "subsystem",
"isochrnous" for "isochronous", "Desctiptors" for "Descriptors", "picutre" for
"picture", "capture" for "capture", "occured" for "ocurred", "connnected" for
"connected","agressively" for "aggressively","manufacturee" for "manufacturer"
and "transaction" for "transaction", "malformatted" for "incorrectly formated"
,"internel" for "internal", "writtento" for "written to", "specificed" for
"specified", "beyound" for "beyond", "Symetric" for "Symmetric". This updates
a total of eleven files.
Signed-off-by: Carlos Bilbao <bilbao@vt.edu>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5710038.lOV4Wx5bFT@iron-maiden
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Pull x86 srbds fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"The 9th episode of the dime novel "The performance killer" with the
subtitle "Slow Randomizing Boosts Denial of Service".
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from
the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New
microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of
RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten
before it is released for reuse. This is equivalent to a full bus
lock, which means that many threads running the RNG instructions in
parallel have the same effect as the same amount of threads issuing a
locked instruction targeting an address which requires locking of two
cachelines at once.
The mitigation support comes with the usual pile of unpleasant
ingredients:
- command line options
- sysfs file
- microcode checks
- a list of vulnerable CPUs identified by model and stepping this
time which requires stepping match support for the cpu match logic.
- the inevitable slowdown of affected CPUs"
* branch 'x86/srbds' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected list
x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentation
x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation
x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
- Support for userspace to send requests directly to the on-chip GZIP
accelerator on Power9.
- Rework of our lockless page table walking (__find_linux_pte()) to
make it safe against parallel page table manipulations without
relying on an IPI for serialisation.
- A series of fixes & enhancements to make our machine check handling
more robust.
- Lots of plumbing to add support for "prefixed" (64-bit) instructions
on Power10.
- Support for using huge pages for the linear mapping on 8xx (32-bit).
- Remove obsolete Xilinx PPC405/PPC440 support, and an associated sound
driver.
- Removal of some obsolete 40x platforms and associated cruft.
- Initial support for booting on Power10.
- Lots of other small features, cleanups & fixes.
Thanks to: Alexey Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple, Andrew Donnellan,
Andrey Abramov, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Balamuruhan S, Bharata B Rao, Bulent
Abali, Cédric Le Goater, Chen Zhou, Christian Zigotzky, Christophe
JAILLET, Christophe Leroy, Dmitry Torokhov, Emmanuel Nicolet, Erhard F.,
Gautham R. Shenoy, Geoff Levand, George Spelvin, Greg Kurz, Gustavo A.
R. Silva, Gustavo Walbon, Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Joel Stanley,
Jordan Niethe, Kajol Jain, Kees Cook, Leonardo Bras, Madhavan
Srinivasan., Mahesh Salgaonkar, Markus Elfring, Michael Neuling, Michal
Simek, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Naveen N. Rao, Nicholas Piggin,
Oliver O'Halloran, Paul Mackerras, Pingfan Liu, Qian Cai, Ram Pai,
Raphael Moreira Zinsly, Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Sandipan Das, Segher
Boessenkool, Stephen Rothwell, Sukadev Bhattiprolu, Tyrel Datwyler,
Wolfram Sang, Xiongfeng Wang.
* tag 'powerpc-5.8-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (299 commits)
powerpc/pseries: Make vio and ibmebus initcalls pseries specific
cxl: Remove dead Kconfig options
powerpc: Add POWER10 architected mode
powerpc/dt_cpu_ftrs: Add MMA feature
powerpc/dt_cpu_ftrs: Enable Prefixed Instructions
powerpc/dt_cpu_ftrs: Advertise support for ISA v3.1 if selected
powerpc: Add support for ISA v3.1
powerpc: Add new HWCAP bits
powerpc/64s: Don't set FSCR bits in INIT_THREAD
powerpc/64s: Save FSCR to init_task.thread.fscr after feature init
powerpc/64s: Don't let DT CPU features set FSCR_DSCR
powerpc/64s: Don't init FSCR_DSCR in __init_FSCR()
powerpc/32s: Fix another build failure with CONFIG_PPC_KUAP_DEBUG
powerpc/module_64: Use special stub for _mcount() with -mprofile-kernel
powerpc/module_64: Simplify check for -mprofile-kernel ftrace relocations
powerpc/module_64: Consolidate ftrace code
powerpc/32: Disable KASAN with pages bigger than 16k
powerpc/uaccess: Don't set KUEP by default on book3s/32
powerpc/uaccess: Don't set KUAP by default on book3s/32
powerpc/8xx: Reduce time spent in allow_user_access() and friends
...
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the
random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode
serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and
RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is
released for reuse.
While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation
is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the
cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.
The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it
increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other
effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.
* Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using
either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
* Export vulnerability status via sysfs
* Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.
[ bp: Massage,
- s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g,
- do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in,
- flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level,
- reflow comments.
jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings
tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now
]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com>
In certain situations it may be useful to prevent some idle states
from being used by default while allowing user space to enable them
later on.
For this purpose, introduce a new state flag, CPUIDLE_FLAG_OFF, to
mark idle states that should be disabled by default, make the core
set CPUIDLE_STATE_DISABLED_BY_USER for those states at the
initialization time and add a new state attribute in sysfs,
"default_status", to inform user space of the initial status of
the given idle state ("disabled" if CPUIDLE_FLAG_OFF is set for it,
"enabled" otherwise).
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Some processors may incur a machine check error possibly resulting in an
unrecoverable CPU lockup when an instruction fetch encounters a TLB
multi-hit in the instruction TLB. This can occur when the page size is
changed along with either the physical address or cache type. The relevant
erratum can be found here:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205195
There are other processors affected for which the erratum does not fully
disclose the impact.
This issue affects both bare-metal x86 page tables and EPT.
It can be mitigated by either eliminating the use of large pages or by
using careful TLB invalidations when changing the page size in the page
tables.
Just like Spectre, Meltdown, L1TF and MDS, a new bit has been allocated in
MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) and will be set on CPUs which
are mitigated against this issue.
Signed-off-by: Vineela Tummalapalli <vineela.tummalapalli@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
There are lots of documents that belong to the admin-guide but
are on random places (most under Documentation root dir).
Move them to the admin guide.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
"It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with
other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on
the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
- A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos,
and one on Spectre vulnerabilities.
- Various improvements to the build system, including automatic
markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I
will never understand, were of the opinion that
:c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type.
- We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
- Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc"
* tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits)
docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs
docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide
Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output
doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq
docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code
Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo
platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document
Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual
Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks
Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST
Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST
docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables
scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build
docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/
Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt
docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used
...
The cpuidle doc was split on two, one at the admin guide
and another one at the driver API guide. Instead of pointing
to a non-existent file, point to both (admin guide being
the first one).
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
