Commit 04597c8d authored by Stephan Müller's avatar Stephan Müller Committed by Herbert Xu
Browse files

crypto: jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs



The oversampling rate (OSR) value specifies the heuristically implied
entropy in the recorded data - H_submitter = 1/osr. A different entropy
estimate implies a different APT/RCT cutoff value. This change adds
support for OSRs 1 through 15. This OSR can be selected by the caller
of the Jitter RNG.

For this patch, the caller still uses one hard-coded OSR. A subsequent
patch allows this value to be configured.

In addition, the power-up self test is adjusted as follows:

* It allows the caller to provide an oversampling rate that should be
tested with - commonly it should be the same as used for the actual
runtime operation. This makes the power-up testing therefore consistent
with the runtime operation.

* It calls now jent_measure_jitter (i.e. collects the full entropy
that can possibly be harvested by the Jitter RNG) instead of only
jent_condition_data (which only returns the entropy harvested from
the conditioning component). This should now alleviate reports where
the Jitter RNG initialization thinks there is too little entropy.

* The power-up test now solely relies on the (enhanced) APT and RCT
test that is used as a health test at runtime.

The code allowing the different OSRs as well as the power-up test
changes are present in the user space version of the Jitter RNG 3.4.1
and thus was already in production use for some time.

Reported-by "Ospan, Abylay" <aospan@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarStephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
parent 7b8c6aee
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+2 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
	crypto_shash_init(sdesc);
	rng->sdesc = sdesc;

	rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, 0, sdesc);
	rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(0, 0, sdesc);
	if (!rng->entropy_collector) {
		ret = -ENOMEM;
		goto err;
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static int __init jent_mod_init(void)

	desc->tfm = tfm;
	crypto_shash_init(desc);
	ret = jent_entropy_init(desc);
	ret = jent_entropy_init(0, 0, desc);
	shash_desc_zero(desc);
	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
	if (ret) {
+119 −114
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ struct rand_data {
	__u64 prev_time;		/* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
	__u64 last_delta;		/* SENSITIVE stuck test */
	__s64 last_delta2;		/* SENSITIVE stuck test */

	unsigned int flags;		/* Flags used to initialize */
	unsigned int osr;		/* Oversample rate */
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
@@ -88,16 +90,9 @@ struct rand_data {
	/* Repetition Count Test */
	unsigned int rct_count;			/* Number of stuck values */

	/* Intermittent health test failure threshold of 2^-30 */
	/* From an SP800-90B perspective, this RCT cutoff value is equal to 31. */
	/* However, our RCT implementation starts at 1, so we subtract 1 here. */
#define JENT_RCT_CUTOFF		(31 - 1)	/* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.1 */
#define JENT_APT_CUTOFF		325			/* Taken from SP800-90B sec 4.4.2 */
	/* Permanent health test failure threshold of 2^-60 */
	/* From an SP800-90B perspective, this RCT cutoff value is equal to 61. */
	/* However, our RCT implementation starts at 1, so we subtract 1 here. */
#define JENT_RCT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT	(61 - 1)
#define JENT_APT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT	355
	/* Adaptive Proportion Test cutoff values */
	unsigned int apt_cutoff; /* Intermittent health test failure */
	unsigned int apt_cutoff_permanent; /* Permanent health test failure */
#define JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE	512	/* Data window size */
	/* LSB of time stamp to process */
#define JENT_APT_LSB		16
@@ -122,6 +117,9 @@ struct rand_data {
				   * zero). */
#define JENT_ESTUCK		8 /* Too many stuck results during init. */
#define JENT_EHEALTH		9 /* Health test failed during initialization */
#define JENT_ERCT	       10 /* RCT failed during initialization */
#define JENT_EHASH	       11 /* Hash self test failed */
#define JENT_EMEM	       12 /* Can't allocate memory for initialization */

/*
 * The output n bits can receive more than n bits of min entropy, of course,
@@ -147,6 +145,48 @@ struct rand_data {
 * This test complies with SP800-90B section 4.4.2.
 ***************************************************************************/

/*
 * See the SP 800-90B comment #10b for the corrected cutoff for the SP 800-90B
 * APT.
 * http://www.untruth.org/~josh/sp80090b/UL%20SP800-90B-final%20comments%20v1.9%2020191212.pdf
 * In in the syntax of R, this is C = 2 + qbinom(1 − 2^(−30), 511, 2^(-1/osr)).
 * (The original formula wasn't correct because the first symbol must
 * necessarily have been observed, so there is no chance of observing 0 of these
 * symbols.)
 *
 * For the alpha < 2^-53, R cannot be used as it uses a float data type without
 * arbitrary precision. A SageMath script is used to calculate those cutoff
 * values.
 *
 * For any value above 14, this yields the maximal allowable value of 512
 * (by FIPS 140-2 IG 7.19 Resolution # 16, we cannot choose a cutoff value that
 * renders the test unable to fail).
 */
static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[15] = {
	325, 422, 459, 477, 488, 494, 499, 502,
	505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512 };
static const unsigned int jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[15] = {
	355, 447, 479, 494, 502, 507, 510, 512,
	512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512, 512 };
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]))

static void jent_apt_init(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int osr)
{
	/*
	 * Establish the apt_cutoff based on the presumed entropy rate of
	 * 1/osr.
	 */
	if (osr >= ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup)) {
		ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[
			ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_lookup) - 1];
		ec->apt_cutoff_permanent = jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[
			ARRAY_SIZE(jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup) - 1];
	} else {
		ec->apt_cutoff = jent_apt_cutoff_lookup[osr - 1];
		ec->apt_cutoff_permanent =
				jent_apt_cutoff_permanent_lookup[osr - 1];
	}
}
/*
 * Reset the APT counter
 *
@@ -187,12 +227,12 @@ static void jent_apt_insert(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned int delta_masked)
/* APT health test failure detection */
static int jent_apt_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
{
	return (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT) ? 1 : 0;
	return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff_permanent) ? 1 : 0;
}

static int jent_apt_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
{
	return (ec->apt_count >= JENT_APT_CUTOFF) ? 1 : 0;
	return (ec->apt_count >= ec->apt_cutoff) ? 1 : 0;
}

/***************************************************************************
@@ -275,15 +315,28 @@ static int jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta)
	return 0;
}

/* RCT health test failure detection */
/*
 * The cutoff value is based on the following consideration:
 * alpha = 2^-30 or 2^-60 as recommended in SP800-90B.
 * In addition, we require an entropy value H of 1/osr as this is the minimum
 * entropy required to provide full entropy.
 * Note, we collect (DATA_SIZE_BITS + ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR)*osr deltas for
 * inserting them into the entropy pool which should then have (close to)
 * DATA_SIZE_BITS bits of entropy in the conditioned output.
 *
 * Note, ec->rct_count (which equals to value B in the pseudo code of SP800-90B
 * section 4.4.1) starts with zero. Hence we need to subtract one from the
 * cutoff value as calculated following SP800-90B. Thus
 * C = ceil(-log_2(alpha)/H) = 30*osr or 60*osr.
 */
static int jent_rct_permanent_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
{
	return (ec->rct_count >= JENT_RCT_CUTOFF_PERMANENT) ? 1 : 0;
	return (ec->rct_count >= (60 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
}

static int jent_rct_failure(struct rand_data *ec)
{
	return (ec->rct_count >= JENT_RCT_CUTOFF) ? 1 : 0;
	return (ec->rct_count >= (30 * ec->osr)) ? 1 : 0;
}

/* Report of health test failures */
@@ -448,7 +501,7 @@ static void jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt)
 *
 * @return result of stuck test
 */
static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 *ret_current_delta)
{
	__u64 time = 0;
	__u64 current_delta = 0;
@@ -472,6 +525,10 @@ static int jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
	if (jent_condition_data(ec, current_delta, stuck))
		stuck = 1;

	/* return the raw entropy value */
	if (ret_current_delta)
		*ret_current_delta = current_delta;

	return stuck;
}

@@ -489,11 +546,11 @@ static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec)
		safety_factor = JENT_ENTROPY_SAFETY_FACTOR;

	/* priming of the ->prev_time value */
	jent_measure_jitter(ec);
	jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL);

	while (!jent_health_failure(ec)) {
		/* If a stuck measurement is received, repeat measurement */
		if (jent_measure_jitter(ec))
		if (jent_measure_jitter(ec, NULL))
			continue;

		/*
@@ -554,7 +611,8 @@ int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
			 * Perform startup health tests and return permanent
			 * error if it fails.
			 */
			if (jent_entropy_init(ec->hash_state))
			if (jent_entropy_init(ec->osr, ec->flags,
					      ec->hash_state))
				return -3;

			return -2;
@@ -604,11 +662,15 @@ struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,

	/* verify and set the oversampling rate */
	if (osr == 0)
		osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
		osr = 1; /* H_submitter = 1 / osr */
	entropy_collector->osr = osr;
	entropy_collector->flags = flags;

	entropy_collector->hash_state = hash_state;

	/* Initialize the APT */
	jent_apt_init(entropy_collector, osr);

	/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
	jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);

@@ -622,20 +684,14 @@ void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
	jent_zfree(entropy_collector);
}

int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags, void *hash_state)
{
	int i;
	__u64 delta_sum = 0;
	__u64 old_delta = 0;
	unsigned int nonstuck = 0;
	int time_backwards = 0;
	int count_mod = 0;
	int count_stuck = 0;
	struct rand_data ec = { 0 };

	/* Required for RCT */
	ec.osr = 1;
	ec.hash_state = hash_state;
	struct rand_data *ec;
	int i, time_backwards = 0, ret = 0;

	ec = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(osr, flags, hash_state);
	if (!ec)
		return JENT_EMEM;

	/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
	 * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
@@ -664,31 +720,28 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
#define TESTLOOPCOUNT 1024
#define CLEARCACHE 100
	for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
		__u64 time = 0;
		__u64 time2 = 0;
		__u64 delta = 0;
		unsigned int lowdelta = 0;
		int stuck;
		__u64 start_time = 0, end_time = 0, delta = 0;

		/* Invoke core entropy collection logic */
		jent_get_nstime(&time);
		ec.prev_time = time;
		jent_condition_data(&ec, time, 0);
		jent_get_nstime(&time2);
		jent_measure_jitter(ec, &delta);
		end_time = ec->prev_time;
		start_time = ec->prev_time - delta;

		/* test whether timer works */
		if (!time || !time2)
			return JENT_ENOTIME;
		delta = jent_delta(time, time2);
		if (!start_time || !end_time) {
			ret = JENT_ENOTIME;
			goto out;
		}

		/*
		 * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
		 * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
		 * implies that we also have a high resolution timer
		 */
		if (!delta)
			return JENT_ECOARSETIME;

		stuck = jent_stuck(&ec, delta);
		if (!delta || (end_time == start_time)) {
			ret = JENT_ECOARSETIME;
			goto out;
		}

		/*
		 * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
@@ -700,49 +753,9 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
		if (i < CLEARCACHE)
			continue;

		if (stuck)
			count_stuck++;
		else {
			nonstuck++;

			/*
			 * Ensure that the APT succeeded.
			 *
			 * With the check below that count_stuck must be less
			 * than 10% of the overall generated raw entropy values
			 * it is guaranteed that the APT is invoked at
			 * floor((TESTLOOPCOUNT * 0.9) / 64) == 14 times.
			 */
			if ((nonstuck % JENT_APT_WINDOW_SIZE) == 0) {
				jent_apt_reset(&ec,
					       delta & JENT_APT_WORD_MASK);
			}
		}

		/* Validate health test result */
		if (jent_health_failure(&ec))
			return JENT_EHEALTH;

		/* test whether we have an increasing timer */
		if (!(time2 > time))
		if (!(end_time > start_time))
			time_backwards++;

		/* use 32 bit value to ensure compilation on 32 bit arches */
		lowdelta = time2 - time;
		if (!(lowdelta % 100))
			count_mod++;

		/*
		 * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
		 * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
		 * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
		 * the old_data value
		 */
		if (delta > old_delta)
			delta_sum += (delta - old_delta);
		else
			delta_sum += (old_delta - delta);
		old_delta = delta;
	}

	/*
@@ -752,31 +765,23 @@ int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state)
	 * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
	 * performed during our test run.
	 */
	if (time_backwards > 3)
		return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;

	/*
	 * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
	 * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
	 * implied with 1 is preserved
	 */
	if ((delta_sum) <= 1)
		return JENT_EVARVAR;
	if (time_backwards > 3) {
		ret = JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at
	 * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter increments
	 * in multiples of 100, but not always
	 */
	if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod)
		return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
	/* Did we encounter a health test failure? */
	if (jent_rct_failure(ec)) {
		ret = JENT_ERCT;
		goto out;
	}
	if (jent_apt_failure(ec)) {
		ret = JENT_EHEALTH;
		goto out;
	}

	/*
	 * If we have more than 90% stuck results, then this Jitter RNG is
	 * likely to not work well.
	 */
	if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_stuck)
		return JENT_ESTUCK;
out:
	jent_entropy_collector_free(ec);

	return 0;
	return ret;
}
+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ extern int jent_hash_time(void *hash_state, __u64 time, u8 *addtl,
int jent_read_random_block(void *hash_state, char *dst, unsigned int dst_len);

struct rand_data;
extern int jent_entropy_init(void *hash_state);
extern int jent_entropy_init(unsigned int osr, unsigned int flags,
			     void *hash_state);
extern int jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, unsigned char *data,
			     unsigned int len);