Commit 0895a000 authored by Ondrej Mosnacek's avatar Ondrej Mosnacek Committed by Andrew Morton
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ucount: check for CAP_SYS_RESOURCE using ns_capable_noaudit()

The user.* sysctls implement the ctl_table_root::permissions hook and they
override the file access mode based on the CAP_SYS_RESOURCE capability (at
most rwx if capable, at most r-- if not).  The capability is being checked
unconditionally, so if an LSM denies the capability, an audit record may
be logged even when access is in fact granted.

Given the logic in the set_permissions() function in kernel/ucount.c and
the unfortunate way the permission checking is implemented, it doesn't
seem viable to avoid false positive denials by deferring the capability
check.  Thus, do the same as in net_ctl_permissions() (net/sysctl_net.c) -
switch from ns_capable() to ns_capable_noaudit(), so that the check never
logs an audit record.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260122140745.239428-1-omosnace@redhat.com


Fixes: dbec2846 ("userns: Add per user namespace sysctls.")
Signed-off-by: default avatarOndrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: default avatarSerge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
parent 89243365
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+1 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static int set_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
	int mode;

	/* Allow users with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE unrestrained access */
	if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
	if (ns_capable_noaudit(user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
		mode = (table->mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
	else
	/* Allow all others at most read-only access */