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Currently, ksmbd does not verify if the user attempting to reconnect to a durable handle is the same user who originally opened the file. This allows any authenticated user to hijack an orphaned durable handle by predicting or brute-forcing the persistent ID. According to MS-SMB2, the server MUST verify that the SecurityContext of the reconnect request matches the SecurityContext associated with the existing open. Add a durable_owner structure to ksmbd_file to store the original opener's UID, GID, and account name. and catpure the owner information when a file handle becomes orphaned. and implementing ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner() to validate the identity of the requester during SMB2_CREATE (DHnC). Fixes: c8efcc78 ("ksmbd: add support for durable handles v1/v2") Reported-by:Davide Ornaghi <d.ornaghi97@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Navaneeth K <knavaneeth786@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>