Commit 73a28d9d authored by Eduard Zingerman's avatar Eduard Zingerman Committed by Andrii Nakryiko
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selftests/bpf: States pruning checks for scalar vs STACK_MISC



Check that stacksafe() compares spilled scalars with STACK_MISC.
The following combinations are explored:
- old spill of imprecise scalar is equivalent to cur STACK_{MISC,INVALID}
  (plus error in unpriv mode);
- old spill of precise scalar is not equivalent to cur STACK_MISC;
- old STACK_MISC is equivalent to cur scalar;
- old STACK_MISC is not equivalent to cur non-scalar.

Signed-off-by: default avatarEduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127175237.526726-7-maxtram95@gmail.com
parent 6efbde20
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+154 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1090,4 +1090,158 @@ l0_%=: r1 >>= 32; \
	: __clobber_all);
}

/* stacksafe(): check if stack spill of an imprecise scalar in old state
 * is considered equivalent to STACK_{MISC,INVALID} in cur state.
 */
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
__msg("8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("8: safe")
__msg("processed 11 insns")
/* STACK_INVALID should prevent verifier in unpriv mode from
 * considering states equivalent and force an error on second
 * verification path (entry - label 1 - label 2).
 */
__failure_unpriv
__msg_unpriv("8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg_unpriv("9: (95) exit")
__msg_unpriv("8: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg_unpriv("invalid read from stack off -8+2 size 8")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void old_imprecise_scalar_vs_cur_stack_misc(void)
{
	asm volatile(
	/* get a random value for branching */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
	/* conjure scalar at fp-8 */
	"r0 = 42;"
	"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
	"goto 2f;"
"1:"
	/* conjure STACK_{MISC,INVALID} at fp-8 */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"*(u16*)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
	"*(u16*)(r10 - 4) = r0;"
"2:"
	/* read fp-8, should be considered safe on second visit */
	"r1 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);"
	"exit;"
	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
	: __clobber_all);
}

/* stacksafe(): check that stack spill of a precise scalar in old state
 * is not considered equivalent to STACK_MISC in cur state.
 */
SEC("socket")
__success __log_level(2)
/* verifier should visit 'if r1 == 0x2a ...' two times:
 * - once for path entry - label 2;
 * - once for path entry - label 1 - label 2.
 */
__msg("if r1 == 0x2a goto pc+0")
__msg("if r1 == 0x2a goto pc+0")
__msg("processed 15 insns")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void old_precise_scalar_vs_cur_stack_misc(void)
{
	asm volatile(
	/* get a random value for branching */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
	/* conjure scalar at fp-8 */
	"r0 = 42;"
	"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
	"goto 2f;"
"1:"
	/* conjure STACK_MISC at fp-8 */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
	"*(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r0;"
"2:"
	/* read fp-8, should not be considered safe on second visit */
	"r1 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);"
	/* use r1 in precise context */
	"if r1 == 42 goto +0;"
	"exit;"
	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
	: __clobber_all);
}

/* stacksafe(): check if STACK_MISC in old state is considered
 * equivalent to stack spill of a scalar in cur state.
 */
SEC("socket")
__success  __log_level(2)
__msg("8: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("8: safe")
__msg("processed 11 insns")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void old_stack_misc_vs_cur_scalar(void)
{
	asm volatile(
	/* get a random value for branching */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
	/* conjure STACK_{MISC,INVALID} at fp-8 */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"*(u16*)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
	"*(u16*)(r10 - 4) = r0;"
	"goto 2f;"
"1:"
	/* conjure scalar at fp-8 */
	"r0 = 42;"
	"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
"2:"
	/* read fp-8, should be considered safe on second visit */
	"r0 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);"
	"exit;"
	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
	: __clobber_all);
}

/* stacksafe(): check that STACK_MISC in old state is not considered
 * equivalent to stack spill of a non-scalar in cur state.
 */
SEC("socket")
__success  __log_level(2)
/* verifier should process exit instructions twice:
 * - once for path entry - label 2;
 * - once for path entry - label 1 - label 2.
 */
__msg("r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("exit")
__msg("r1 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)")
__msg("exit")
__msg("processed 11 insns")
__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ)
__naked void old_stack_misc_vs_cur_ctx_ptr(void)
{
	asm volatile(
	/* remember context pointer in r9 */
	"r9 = r1;"
	/* get a random value for branching */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"if r0 == 0 goto 1f;"
	/* conjure STACK_MISC at fp-8 */
	"call %[bpf_ktime_get_ns];"
	"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0;"
	"*(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r0;"
	"goto 2f;"
"1:"
	/* conjure context pointer in fp-8 */
	"*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r9;"
"2:"
	/* read fp-8, should not be considered safe on second visit */
	"r1 = *(u64*)(r10 - 8);"
	"exit;"
	:
	: __imm(bpf_ktime_get_ns)
	: __clobber_all);
}

char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";