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usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow. Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the `common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables. So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses. Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows. Fixes: 144974e7 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size") Signed-off-by:Seungjin Bae <eeodqql09@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260228104324.1696455-2-eeodqql09@gmail.com Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>