Commit 8479891d authored by Seungjin Bae's avatar Seungjin Bae Committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
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usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()



The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size
in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block
size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether
this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.

Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the
`common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During
initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction
between two variables.

So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command
requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the
left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data
size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory
corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.

Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the
shift and catch any overflows.

Fixes: 144974e7 ("usb: gadget: mass_storage: support multi-luns with different logic block size")
Signed-off-by: default avatarSeungjin Bae <eeodqql09@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: default avatarAlan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260228104324.1696455-2-eeodqql09@gmail.com


Signed-off-by: default avatarGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
parent 7f58b414
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+10 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -180,6 +180,7 @@
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/overflow.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -1853,8 +1854,15 @@ static int check_command_size_in_blocks(struct fsg_common *common,
		int cmnd_size, enum data_direction data_dir,
		unsigned int mask, int needs_medium, const char *name)
{
	if (common->curlun)
		common->data_size_from_cmnd <<= common->curlun->blkbits;
	if (common->curlun) {
		if (check_shl_overflow(common->data_size_from_cmnd,
				       common->curlun->blkbits,
				       &common->data_size_from_cmnd)) {
			common->phase_error = 1;
			return -EINVAL;
		}
	}

	return check_command(common, cmnd_size, data_dir,
			mask, needs_medium, name);
}