Unverified Commit 875ccc0d authored by Mateusz Guzik's avatar Mateusz Guzik Committed by Christian Brauner
Browse files

fs: touch up predicts in inode_permission() 



The routine only encounters errors when people try to access things they
can't, which is a negligible amount of calls.

The only questionable bit might be the pre-existing predict around
MAY_WRITE. Currently the routine is predominantly used for MAY_EXEC, so
this makes some sense.

I verified this straightens out the asm.

Signed-off-by: default avatarMateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250416221626.2710239-2-mjguzik@gmail.com


Signed-off-by: default avatarChristian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
parent 79beea2d

fs/namei.c

+5 −5
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -571,14 +571,14 @@ int inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 
	int retval;



	retval = sb_permission(inode->i_sb, inode, mask);

	if (retval)

	if (unlikely(retval))

		return retval;



	if (unlikely(mask & MAY_WRITE)) {

		/*

		 * Nobody gets write access to an immutable file.

		 */

		if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))

		if (unlikely(IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)))

			return -EPERM;



		/*
@@ -586,16 +586,16 @@ int inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, 
		 * written back improperly if their true value is unknown

		 * to the vfs.

		 */

		if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(idmap, inode))

		if (unlikely(HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(idmap, inode)))

			return -EACCES;

	}



	retval = do_inode_permission(idmap, inode, mask);

	if (retval)

	if (unlikely(retval))

		return retval;



	retval = devcgroup_inode_permission(inode, mask);

	if (retval)

	if (unlikely(retval))

		return retval;



	return security_inode_permission(inode, mask);