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blkdev_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to calculate the allocation size for keys_info via struct_size(). While there is a check for SIZE_MAX (integer overflow), there is no upper bound validation on the allocation size itself. A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that doesn't trigger overflow but still results in an excessive allocation attempt, causing a warning in the page allocator when the order exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER. Fix this by introducing PR_KEYS_MAX to limit the number of keys to a sane value. This makes the SIZE_MAX check redundant, so remove it. Also switch to kvzalloc/kvfree to handle larger allocations gracefully. Fixes: 22a1ffea ("block: add IOC_PR_READ_KEYS ioctl") Tested-by:<syzbot+660d079d90f8a1baf54d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Reported-by:
<syzbot+660d079d90f8a1baf54d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=660d079d90f8a1baf54d Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251212013510.3576091-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v1] Signed-off-by:
Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>