Commit bd96a393 authored by Dan Carpenter's avatar Dan Carpenter Committed by Jason Gunthorpe
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rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit

The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user.  It comes from
process_responses().  On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct
cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an
integer wrapping bug.  Use size_add() to prevent this.

Fixes: 1cab775c ("RDMA/cxgb4: Fix LE hash collision bug for passive open connection")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/86b404e1-4a75-4a35-a34e-e3054fa554c7@stanley.mountain


Signed-off-by: default avatarDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarJason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
parent fbef60de
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+4 −2
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -1114,8 +1114,10 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *copy_gl_to_skb_pkt(const struct pkt_gl *gl,
	 * The math here assumes sizeof cpl_pass_accept_req >= sizeof
	 * cpl_rx_pkt.
	 */
	skb = alloc_skb(gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
			sizeof(struct rss_header) - pktshift, GFP_ATOMIC);
	skb = alloc_skb(size_add(gl->tot_len,
				 sizeof(struct cpl_pass_accept_req) +
				 sizeof(struct rss_header)) - pktshift,
			GFP_ATOMIC);
	if (unlikely(!skb))
		return NULL;