Commit e6799702 authored by Borislav Petkov (AMD)'s avatar Borislav Petkov (AMD)
Browse files

x86/bugs: Get rid of the forward declarations 



Get rid of the forward declarations of the mitigation functions by
moving their single caller below them.

No functional changes.

Suggested-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarBorislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: default avatarJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251105200447.GBaQut3w4dLilZrX-z@fat_crate.local
parent e9cc9914

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

+93 −140
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -53,53 +53,6 @@ 
 * mitigation option.

 */



static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init ssb_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init mmio_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init bhi_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init its_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init its_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init tsa_apply_mitigation(void);

static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void);

static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void);

static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void);



/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */

u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;

EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
@@ -233,99 +186,6 @@ static void __init cpu_print_attack_vectors(void) 
	}

}



void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)

{

	/*

	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may

	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD

	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.

	 */

	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {

		rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);



		/*

		 * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls

		 * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below

		 * rediscover them based on configuration.

		 */

		x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;

	}



	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();



	cpu_print_attack_vectors();



	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */

	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();

	retbleed_select_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();

	ssb_select_mitigation();

	l1tf_select_mitigation();

	mds_select_mitigation();

	taa_select_mitigation();

	mmio_select_mitigation();

	rfds_select_mitigation();

	srbds_select_mitigation();

	l1d_flush_select_mitigation();

	srso_select_mitigation();

	gds_select_mitigation();

	its_select_mitigation();

	bhi_select_mitigation();

	tsa_select_mitigation();

	vmscape_select_mitigation();



	/*

	 * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their

	 * choices.

	 */

	spectre_v2_update_mitigation();

	/*

	 * retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by

	 * spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about

	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.

	 */

	retbleed_update_mitigation();

	/*

	 * its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()

	 * and retbleed_update_mitigation().

	 */

	its_update_mitigation();



	/*

	 * spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on

	 * retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP

	 * selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.

	 */

	spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();

	mds_update_mitigation();

	taa_update_mitigation();

	mmio_update_mitigation();

	rfds_update_mitigation();

	bhi_update_mitigation();

	/* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */

	srso_update_mitigation();

	vmscape_update_mitigation();



	spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();

	retbleed_apply_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();

	ssb_apply_mitigation();

	l1tf_apply_mitigation();

	mds_apply_mitigation();

	taa_apply_mitigation();

	mmio_apply_mitigation();

	rfds_apply_mitigation();

	srbds_apply_mitigation();

	srso_apply_mitigation();

	gds_apply_mitigation();

	its_apply_mitigation();

	bhi_apply_mitigation();

	tsa_apply_mitigation();

	vmscape_apply_mitigation();

}



/*

 * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM, since Intel uses

 * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for SSBD.
@@ -3376,6 +3236,99 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void) 
	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);

}



void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)

{

	/*

	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may

	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD

	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.

	 */

	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {

		rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);



		/*

		 * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls

		 * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below

		 * rediscover them based on configuration.

		 */

		x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;

	}



	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();



	cpu_print_attack_vectors();



	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */

	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();

	retbleed_select_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();

	ssb_select_mitigation();

	l1tf_select_mitigation();

	mds_select_mitigation();

	taa_select_mitigation();

	mmio_select_mitigation();

	rfds_select_mitigation();

	srbds_select_mitigation();

	l1d_flush_select_mitigation();

	srso_select_mitigation();

	gds_select_mitigation();

	its_select_mitigation();

	bhi_select_mitigation();

	tsa_select_mitigation();

	vmscape_select_mitigation();



	/*

	 * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their

	 * choices.

	 */

	spectre_v2_update_mitigation();

	/*

	 * retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by

	 * spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about

	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.

	 */

	retbleed_update_mitigation();

	/*

	 * its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()

	 * and retbleed_update_mitigation().

	 */

	its_update_mitigation();



	/*

	 * spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on

	 * retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP

	 * selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.

	 */

	spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();

	mds_update_mitigation();

	taa_update_mitigation();

	mmio_update_mitigation();

	rfds_update_mitigation();

	bhi_update_mitigation();

	/* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */

	srso_update_mitigation();

	vmscape_update_mitigation();



	spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();

	retbleed_apply_mitigation();

	spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();

	ssb_apply_mitigation();

	l1tf_apply_mitigation();

	mds_apply_mitigation();

	taa_apply_mitigation();

	mmio_apply_mitigation();

	rfds_apply_mitigation();

	srbds_apply_mitigation();

	srso_apply_mitigation();

	gds_apply_mitigation();

	its_apply_mitigation();

	bhi_apply_mitigation();

	tsa_apply_mitigation();

	vmscape_apply_mitigation();

}



#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS



#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"