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userdatum_value_store() bounds count by MAX_EXTRADATA_VALUE_LEN (200) and then copies straight into udm->value, which is itself 200 bytes: if (count > MAX_EXTRADATA_VALUE_LEN) return -EMSGSIZE; ... ret = strscpy(udm->value, buf, sizeof(udm->value)); if (ret < 0) goto out_unlock; If userspace writes exactly MAX_EXTRADATA_VALUE_LEN bytes with no NUL within them, strscpy() copies 199 bytes plus a NUL into udm->value and returns -E2BIG. The function jumps to out_unlock and reports the error to userspace, but udm->value has already been overwritten with the truncated string and update_userdata() is skipped, so the corruption is not yet visible on the wire. The next successful write to any userdatum entry under the same target calls update_userdata(), which packs udm->value into the active netconsole payload. From that point on, every netconsole message carries the silently truncated value, and userspace has no indication that a previous, error-returning write left state behind. Tighten the entry check from "count > MAX_EXTRADATA_VALUE_LEN" to "count >= MAX_EXTRADATA_VALUE_LEN". With count strictly less than sizeof(udm->value), strscpy() can no longer return -E2BIG here, so the corrupting truncation path is removed entirely. Fixes: 8a6d5fec ("net: netconsole: add a userdata config_group member to netconsole_target") Signed-off-by:Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260427-netconsole_ai_fixes-v2-2-59965f29d9cc@debian.org Signed-off-by:
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>