Commit fc3a2810 authored by Jakub Kicinski's avatar Jakub Kicinski
Browse files


Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-6.17-rc6).

Conflicts:

net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c
net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo_avx2.c
  c4eaca2e ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: don't check genbit from packetpath lookups")
  84c1da7b ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: use avx2 algorithm for insertions too")

Only trivial adjacent changes (in a doc and a Makefile).

Signed-off-by: default avatarJakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
parents 5f790208 db87bd2a
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@@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsa
		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
Date:		January 2018
Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
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@@ -26,3 +26,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
   rsb
   old_microcode
   indirect-target-selection
   vmscape
+110 −0
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.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

VMSCAPE
=======

VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that may allow a guest to influence the branch
prediction in host userspace. It particularly affects hypervisors like QEMU.

Even if a hypervisor may not have any sensitive data like disk encryption keys,
guest-userspace may be able to attack the guest-kernel using the hypervisor as
a confused deputy.

Affected processors
-------------------

The following CPU families are affected by VMSCAPE:

**Intel processors:**
  - Skylake generation (Parts without Enhanced-IBRS)
  - Cascade Lake generation - (Parts affected by ITS guest/host separation)
  - Alder Lake and newer (Parts affected by BHI)

Note that, BHI affected parts that use BHB clearing software mitigation e.g.
Icelake are not vulnerable to VMSCAPE.

**AMD processors:**
  - Zen series (families 0x17, 0x19, 0x1a)

** Hygon processors:**
 - Family 0x18

Mitigation
----------

Conditional IBPB
----------------

Kernel tracks when a CPU has run a potentially malicious guest and issues an
IBPB before the first exit to userspace after VM-exit. If userspace did not run
between VM-exit and the next VM-entry, no IBPB is issued.

Note that the existing userspace mitigation against Spectre-v2 is effective in
protecting the userspace. They are insufficient to protect the userspace VMMs
from a malicious guest. This is because Spectre-v2 mitigations are applied at
context switch time, while the userspace VMM can run after a VM-exit without a
context switch.

Vulnerability enumeration and mitigation is not applied inside a guest. This is
because nested hypervisors should already be deploying IBPB to isolate
themselves from nested guests.

SMT considerations
------------------

When Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT) is enabled, hypervisors can be
vulnerable to cross-thread attacks. For complete protection against VMSCAPE
attacks in SMT environments, STIBP should be enabled.

The kernel will issue a warning if SMT is enabled without adequate STIBP
protection. Warning is not issued when:

- SMT is disabled
- STIBP is enabled system-wide
- Intel eIBRS is enabled (which implies STIBP protection)

System information and options
------------------------------

The sysfs file showing VMSCAPE mitigation status is:

  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape

The possible values in this file are:

 * 'Not affected':

   The processor is not vulnerable to VMSCAPE attacks.

 * 'Vulnerable':

   The processor is vulnerable and no mitigation has been applied.

 * 'Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace':

   Conditional IBPB mitigation is enabled. The kernel tracks when a CPU has
   run a potentially malicious guest and issues an IBPB before the first
   exit to userspace after VM-exit.

 * 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT':

   IBPB is issued on every VM-exit. This occurs when other mitigations like
   RETBLEED or SRSO are already issuing IBPB on VM-exit.

Mitigation control on the kernel command line
----------------------------------------------

The mitigation can be controlled via the ``vmscape=`` command line parameter:

 * ``vmscape=off``:

   Disable the VMSCAPE mitigation.

 * ``vmscape=ibpb``:

   Enable conditional IBPB mitigation (default when CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE=y).

 * ``vmscape=force``:

   Force vulnerability detection and mitigation even on processors that are
   not known to be affected.
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@@ -3829,6 +3829,7 @@
					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
					       vmscape=off [X86]

				Exceptions:
					       This does not have any effect on
@@ -8041,6 +8042,16 @@
	vmpoff=		[KNL,S390] Perform z/VM CP command after power off.
			Format: <command>

	vmscape=	[X86] Controls mitigation for VMscape attacks.
			VMscape attacks can leak information from a userspace
			hypervisor to a guest via speculative side-channels.

			off		- disable the mitigation
			ibpb		- use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
					  (IBPB) mitigation (default)
			force		- force vulnerability detection even on
					  unaffected processors

	vsyscall=	[X86-64,EARLY]
			Controls the behavior of vsyscalls (i.e. calls to
			fixed addresses of 0xffffffffff600x00 from legacy
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ properties:
      - enum:
          - fsl,imx7ulp-spi
          - fsl,imx8qxp-spi
          - nxp,s32g2-lpspi
      - items:
          - enum:
              - fsl,imx8ulp-spi
@@ -27,6 +28,10 @@ properties:
              - fsl,imx94-spi
              - fsl,imx95-spi
          - const: fsl,imx7ulp-spi
      - items:
          - const: nxp,s32g3-lpspi
          - const: nxp,s32g2-lpspi

  reg:
    maxItems: 1

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