Merge tag 'for-linus-fwctl' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdma/rdma

 16  _/X   65536  auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros

 17  _/T  131072  kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin

 18  _/N  262144  an in-kernel test has been run

 19  _/J  524288  userspace used a mutating debug operation in fwctl

===  ===  ======  ========================================================

Note: The character ``_`` is representing a blank in this table to make reading

     build time.

 18) ``N`` if an in-kernel test, such as a KUnit test, has been run.

 19) ``J`` if userpace opened /dev/fwctl/* and performed a FWTCL_RPC_DEBUG_WRITE

     to use the devices debugging features. Device debugging features could

     cause the device to malfunction in undefined ways.

.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

================

fwctl cxl driver

================

:Author: Dave Jiang

Overview

========

The CXL spec defines a set of commands that can be issued to the mailbox of a

CXL device or switch. It also left room for vendor specific commands to be

issued to the mailbox as well. fwctl provides a path to issue a set of allowed

mailbox commands from user space to the device moderated by the kernel driver.

The following 3 commands will be used to support CXL Features:

CXL spec r3.1 8.2.9.6.1 Get Supported Features (Opcode 0500h)

CXL spec r3.1 8.2.9.6.2 Get Feature (Opcode 0501h)

CXL spec r3.1 8.2.9.6.3 Set Feature (Opcode 0502h)

The "Get Supported Features" return data may be filtered by the kernel driver to

drop any features that are forbidden by the kernel or being exclusively used by

the kernel. The driver will set the "Set Feature Size" of the "Get Supported

Features Supported Feature Entry" to 0 to indicate that the Feature cannot be

modified. The "Get Supported Features" command and the "Get Features" falls

under the fwctl policy of FWCTL_RPC_CONFIGURATION.

For "Set Feature" command, the access policy currently is broken down into two

categories depending on the Set Feature effects reported by the device. If the

Set Feature will cause immediate change to the device, the fwctl access policy

must be FWCTL_RPC_DEBUG_WRITE_FULL. The effects for this level are

"immediate config change", "immediate data change", "immediate policy change",

or "immediate log change" for the set effects mask. If the effects are "config

change with cold reset" or "config change with conventional reset", then the

fwctl access policy must be FWCTL_RPC_DEBUG_WRITE or higher.

fwctl cxl User API

==================

.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/fwctl/cxl.h

1. Driver info query

--------------------

First step for the app is to issue the ioctl(FWCTL_CMD_INFO). Successful

invocation of the ioctl implies the Features capability is operational and

returns an all zeros 32bit payload. A ``struct fwctl_info`` needs to be filled

out with the ``fwctl_info.out_device_type`` set to ``FWCTL_DEVICE_TYPE_CXL``.

The return data should be ``struct fwctl_info_cxl`` that contains a reserved

32bit field that should be all zeros.

2. Send hardware commands

-------------------------

Next step is to send the 'Get Supported Features' command to the driver from

user space via ioctl(FWCTL_RPC). A ``struct fwctl_rpc_cxl`` is pointed to

by ``fwctl_rpc.in``. ``struct fwctl_rpc_cxl.in_payload`` points to

the hardware input structure that is defined by the CXL spec. ``fwctl_rpc.out``

points to the buffer that contains a ``struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out`` that includes

the hardware output data inlined as ``fwctl_rpc_cxl_out.payload``. This command

is called twice. First time to retrieve the number of features supported.

A second time to retrieve the specific feature details as the output data.

After getting the specific feature details, a Get/Set Feature command can be

appropriately programmed and sent. For a "Set Feature" command, the retrieved

feature info contains an effects field that details the resulting

"Set Feature" command will trigger. That will inform the user whether

the system is configured to allowed the "Set Feature" command or not.

Code example of a Get Feature

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.. code-block:: c

        static int cxl_fwctl_rpc_get_test_feature(int fd, struct test_feature *feat_ctx,

                                                  const uint32_t expected_data)

        {

                struct cxl_mbox_get_feat_in *feat_in;

                struct fwctl_rpc_cxl_out *out;

                struct fwctl_rpc rpc = {0};

                struct fwctl_rpc_cxl *in;

                size_t out_size, in_size;

                uint32_t val;

                void *data;

                int rc;

                in_size = sizeof(*in) + sizeof(*feat_in);

                rc = posix_memalign((void **)&in, 16, in_size);

                if (rc)

                        return -ENOMEM;

                memset(in, 0, in_size);

                feat_in = &in->get_feat_in;

                uuid_copy(feat_in->uuid, feat_ctx->uuid);

                feat_in->count = feat_ctx->get_size;

                out_size = sizeof(*out) + feat_ctx->get_size;

                rc = posix_memalign((void **)&out, 16, out_size);

                if (rc)

                        goto free_in;

                memset(out, 0, out_size);

                in->opcode = CXL_MBOX_OPCODE_GET_FEATURE;

                in->op_size = sizeof(*feat_in);

                rpc.size = sizeof(rpc);

                rpc.scope = FWCTL_RPC_CONFIGURATION;

                rpc.in_len = in_size;

                rpc.out_len = out_size;

                rpc.in = (uint64_t)(uint64_t *)in;

                rpc.out = (uint64_t)(uint64_t *)out;

                rc = send_command(fd, &rpc, out);

                if (rc)

                        goto free_all;

                data = out->payload;

                val = le32toh(*(__le32 *)data);

                if (memcmp(&val, &expected_data, sizeof(val)) != 0) {

                        rc = -ENXIO;

                        goto free_all;

                }

        free_all:

                free(out);

        free_in:

                free(in);

                return rc;

        }

Take a look at CXL CLI test directory

<https://github.com/pmem/ndctl/tree/main/test/fwctl.c> for a detailed user code

for examples on how to exercise this path.

fwctl cxl Kernel API

====================

.. kernel-doc:: drivers/cxl/core/features.c

   :export:

.. kernel-doc:: include/cxl/features.h

.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

===============

fwctl subsystem

===============

:Author: Jason Gunthorpe

Overview

========

Modern devices contain extensive amounts of FW, and in many cases, are largely

software-defined pieces of hardware. The evolution of this approach is largely a

reaction to Moore's Law where a chip tape out is now highly expensive, and the

chip design is extremely large. Replacing fixed HW logic with a flexible and

tightly coupled FW/HW combination is an effective risk mitigation against chip

respin. Problems in the HW design can be counteracted in device FW. This is

especially true for devices which present a stable and backwards compatible

interface to the operating system driver (such as NVMe).

The FW layer in devices has grown to incredible size and devices frequently

integrate clusters of fast processors to run it. For example, mlx5 devices have

over 30MB of FW code, and big configurations operate with over 1GB of FW managed

runtime state.

The availability of such a flexible layer has created quite a variety in the

industry where single pieces of silicon are now configurable software-defined

devices and can operate in substantially different ways depending on the need.

Further, we often see cases where specific sites wish to operate devices in ways

that are highly specialized and require applications that have been tailored to

their unique configuration.

Further, devices have become multi-functional and integrated to the point they

no longer fit neatly into the kernel's division of subsystems. Modern

multi-functional devices have drivers, such as bnxt/ice/mlx5/pds, that span many

subsystems while sharing the underlying hardware using the auxiliary device

system.

All together this creates a challenge for the operating system, where devices

have an expansive FW environment that needs robust device-specific debugging

support, and FW-driven functionality that is not well suited to “generic”

interfaces. fwctl seeks to allow access to the full device functionality from

user space in the areas of debuggability, management, and first-boot/nth-boot

provisioning.

fwctl is aimed at the common device design pattern where the OS and FW

communicate via an RPC message layer constructed with a queue or mailbox scheme.

In this case the driver will typically have some layer to deliver RPC messages

and collect RPC responses from device FW. The in-kernel subsystem drivers that

operate the device for its primary purposes will use these RPCs to build their

drivers, but devices also usually have a set of ancillary RPCs that don't really

fit into any specific subsystem. For example, a HW RAID controller is primarily

operated by the block layer but also comes with a set of RPCs to administer the

construction of drives within the HW RAID.

In the past when devices were more single function, individual subsystems would

grow different approaches to solving some of these common problems. For instance

monitoring device health, manipulating its FLASH, debugging the FW,

provisioning, all have various unique interfaces across the kernel.

fwctl's purpose is to define a common set of limited rules, described below,

that allow user space to securely construct and execute RPCs inside device FW.

The rules serve as an agreement between the operating system and FW on how to

correctly design the RPC interface. As a uAPI the subsystem provides a thin

layer of discovery and a generic uAPI to deliver the RPCs and collect the

response. It supports a system of user space libraries and tools which will

use this interface to control the device using the device native protocols.

Scope of Action

---------------

fwctl drivers are strictly restricted to being a way to operate the device FW.

It is not an avenue to access random kernel internals, or other operating system

SW states.

fwctl instances must operate on a well-defined device function, and the device

should have a well-defined security model for what scope within the physical

device the function is permitted to access. For instance, the most complex PCIe

device today may broadly have several function-level scopes:

 1. A privileged function with full access to the on-device global state and

    configuration

 2. Multiple hypervisor functions with control over itself and child functions

    used with VMs

 3. Multiple VM functions tightly scoped within the VM

The device may create a logical parent/child relationship between these scopes.

For instance a child VM's FW may be within the scope of the hypervisor FW. It is

quite common in the VFIO world that the hypervisor environment has a complex

provisioning/profiling/configuration responsibility for the function VFIO

assigns to the VM.

Further, within the function, devices often have RPC commands that fall within

some general scopes of action (see enum fwctl_rpc_scope):

 1. Access to function & child configuration, FLASH, etc. that becomes live at a

    function reset. Access to function & child runtime configuration that is

    transparent or non-disruptive to any driver or VM.

 2. Read-only access to function debug information that may report on FW objects

    in the function & child, including FW objects owned by other kernel

    subsystems.

 3. Write access to function & child debug information strictly compatible with

    the principles of kernel lockdown and kernel integrity protection. Triggers

    a kernel Taint.

 4. Full debug device access. Triggers a kernel Taint, requires CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

User space will provide a scope label on each RPC and the kernel must enforce the

above CAPs and taints based on that scope. A combination of kernel and FW can

enforce that RPCs are placed in the correct scope by user space.

Denied behavior

---------------

There are many things this interface must not allow user space to do (without a

Taint or CAP), broadly derived from the principles of kernel lockdown. Some

examples:

 1. DMA to/from arbitrary memory, hang the system, compromise FW integrity with

    untrusted code, or otherwise compromise device or system security and

    integrity.

 2. Provide an abnormal “back door” to kernel drivers. No manipulation of kernel

    objects owned by kernel drivers.

 3. Directly configure or otherwise control kernel drivers. A subsystem kernel

    driver can react to the device configuration at function reset/driver load

    time, but otherwise must not be coupled to fwctl.

 4. Operate the HW in a way that overlaps with the core purpose of another

    primary kernel subsystem, such as read/write to LBAs, send/receive of

    network packets, or operate an accelerator's data plane.

fwctl is not a replacement for device direct access subsystems like uacce or

VFIO.

Operations exposed through fwctl's non-taining interfaces should be fully

sharable with other users of the device. For instance exposing a RPC through

fwctl should never prevent a kernel subsystem from also concurrently using that

same RPC or hardware unit down the road. In such cases fwctl will be less

important than proper kernel subsystems that eventually emerge. Mistakes in this

area resulting in clashes will be resolved in favour of a kernel implementation.

fwctl User API

==============

.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/fwctl/fwctl.h

.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/fwctl/mlx5.h

.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/fwctl/pds.h

sysfs Class

-----------

fwctl has a sysfs class (/sys/class/fwctl/fwctlNN/) and character devices

(/dev/fwctl/fwctlNN) with a simple numbered scheme. The character device

operates the iotcl uAPI described above.

fwctl devices can be related to driver components in other subsystems through

sysfs::

    $ ls /sys/class/fwctl/fwctl0/device/infiniband/

    ibp0s10f0

    $ ls /sys/class/infiniband/ibp0s10f0/device/fwctl/

    fwctl0/

    $ ls /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:0a.0/fwctl/fwctl0

    dev  device  power  subsystem  uevent

User space Community

--------------------

Drawing inspiration from nvme-cli, participating in the kernel side must come

with a user space in a common TBD git tree, at a minimum to usefully operate the

kernel driver. Providing such an implementation is a pre-condition to merging a

kernel driver.

The goal is to build user space community around some of the shared problems

we all have, and ideally develop some common user space programs with some

starting themes of:

 - Device in-field debugging

 - HW provisioning

 - VFIO child device profiling before VM boot

 - Confidential Compute topics (attestation, secure provisioning)

that stretch across all subsystems in the kernel. fwupd is a great example of

how an excellent user space experience can emerge out of kernel-side diversity.

fwctl Kernel API

================

.. kernel-doc:: drivers/fwctl/main.c

   :export:

.. kernel-doc:: include/linux/fwctl.h

fwctl Driver design

-------------------

In many cases a fwctl driver is going to be part of a larger cross-subsystem

device possibly using the auxiliary_device mechanism. In that case several

subsystems are going to be sharing the same device and FW interface layer so the

device design must already provide for isolation and cooperation between kernel

subsystems. fwctl should fit into that same model.

Part of the driver should include a description of how its scope restrictions

and security model work. The driver and FW together must ensure that RPCs

provided by user space are mapped to the appropriate scope. If the validation is

done in the driver then the validation can read a 'command effects' report from

the device, or hardwire the enforcement. If the validation is done in the FW,

then the driver should pass the fwctl_rpc_scope to the FW along with the command.

The driver and FW must cooperate to ensure that either fwctl cannot allocate

any FW resources, or any resources it does allocate are freed on FD closure.  A

driver primarily constructed around FW RPCs may find that its core PCI function

and RPC layer belongs under fwctl with auxiliary devices connecting to other

subsystems.

Each device type must be mindful of Linux's philosophy for stable ABI. The FW

RPC interface does not have to meet a strictly stable ABI, but it does need to

meet an expectation that userspace tools that are deployed and in significant

use don't needlessly break. FW upgrade and kernel upgrade should keep widely

deployed tooling working.

Development and debugging focused RPCs under more permissive scopes can have

less stabilitiy if the tools using them are only run under exceptional

circumstances and not for every day use of the device. Debugging tools may even

require exact version matching as they may require something similar to DWARF

debug information from the FW binary.

Security Response

=================

The kernel remains the gatekeeper for this interface. If violations of the

scopes, security or isolation principles are found, we have options to let

devices fix them with a FW update, push a kernel patch to parse and block RPC

commands or push a kernel patch to block entire firmware versions/devices.

While the kernel can always directly parse and restrict RPCs, it is expected

that the existing kernel pattern of allowing drivers to delegate validation to

FW to be a useful design.

Existing Similar Examples

=========================

The approach described in this document is not a new idea. Direct, or near

direct device access has been offered by the kernel in different areas for

decades. With more devices wanting to follow this design pattern it is becoming

clear that it is not entirely well understood and, more importantly, the

security considerations are not well defined or agreed upon.

Some examples:

 - HW RAID controllers. This includes RPCs to do things like compose drives into

   a RAID volume, configure RAID parameters, monitor the HW and more.

 - Baseboard managers. RPCs for configuring settings in the device and more

 - NVMe vendor command capsules. nvme-cli provides access to some monitoring

   functions that different products have defined, but more exist.

 - CXL also has a NVMe-like vendor command system.

 - DRM allows user space drivers to send commands to the device via kernel

   mediation

 - RDMA allows user space drivers to directly push commands to the device

   without kernel involvement

 - Various “raw” APIs, raw HID (SDL2), raw USB, NVMe Generic Interface, etc.

The first 4 are examples of areas that fwctl intends to cover. The latter three

are examples of denied behavior as they fully overlap with the primary purpose

of a kernel subsystem.

Some key lessons learned from these past efforts are the importance of having a

common user space project to use as a pre-condition for obtaining a kernel

driver. Developing good community around useful software in user space is key to

getting companies to fund participation to enable their products.

.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

Firmware Control (FWCTL) Userspace API

======================================

A framework that define a common set of limited rules that allows user space

to securely construct and execute RPCs inside device firmware.

.. toctree::

   :maxdepth: 1

   fwctl

   fwctl-cxl

   pds_fwctl

.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0

================

fwctl pds driver

================

:Author: Shannon Nelson

Overview

========

The PDS Core device makes a fwctl service available through an

auxiliary_device named pds_core.fwctl.N.  The pds_fwctl driver binds to

this device and registers itself with the fwctl subsystem.  The resulting

userspace interface is used by an application that is a part of the

AMD Pensando software package for the Distributed Service Card (DSC).

The pds_fwctl driver has little knowledge of the firmware's internals.

It only knows how to send commands through pds_core's message queue to the

firmware for fwctl requests.  The set of fwctl operations available

depends on the firmware in the DSC, and the userspace application

version must match the firmware so that they can talk to each other.

When a connection is created the pds_fwctl driver requests from the

firmware a list of firmware object endpoints, and for each endpoint the

driver requests a list of operations for that endpoint.

Each operation description includes a firmware defined command attribute

that maps to the FWCTL scope levels.  The driver translates those firmware

values into the FWCTL scope values which can then be used for filtering the

scoped user requests.

pds_fwctl User API

==================

Each RPC request includes the target endpoint and the operation id, and in

and out buffer lengths and pointers.  The driver verifies the existence

of the requested endpoint and operations, then checks the request scope

against the required scope of the operation.  The request is then put

together with the request data and sent through pds_core's message queue

to the firmware, and the results are returned to the caller.

The RPC endpoints, operations, and buffer contents are defined by the

particular firmware package in the device, which varies across the

available product configurations.  The details are available in the

specific product SDK documentation.