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authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least 4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data. While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create() still copied auth->digestsize into inst->alg.maxauthsize without validating it. The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default authsize from that value. As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the same value. AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access. Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default authsize. Fixes: f15f05b0 ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver") Cc: stable@kernel.org Reported-by:Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com> Co-developed-by:
Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com> Suggested-by:
Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn> Tested-by:
Yuhang Zheng <z1652074432@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Yucheng Lu <kanolyc@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>