Commit a9a10e92 authored by Linus Torvalds's avatar Linus Torvalds
Browse files

Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 CPU mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:

 - Convert the tsx= cmdline parsing to use early_param()

 - Cleanup forward declarations gunk in bugs.c

* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
  x86/bugs: Get rid of the forward declarations
  x86/tsx: Get the tsx= command line parameter with early_param()
  x86/tsx: Make tsx_ctrl_state static
parents cb502f0e e6799702
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+93 −140
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -53,53 +53,6 @@
 * mitigation option.
 */

static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init bhi_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init bhi_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init bhi_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init its_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init its_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init its_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init tsa_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init tsa_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void);

/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
@@ -233,99 +186,6 @@ static void __init cpu_print_attack_vectors(void)
	}
}

void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
{
	/*
	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
	 */
	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
		rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);

		/*
		 * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
		 * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
		 * rediscover them based on configuration.
		 */
		x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
	}

	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

	cpu_print_attack_vectors();

	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
	retbleed_select_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
	ssb_select_mitigation();
	l1tf_select_mitigation();
	mds_select_mitigation();
	taa_select_mitigation();
	mmio_select_mitigation();
	rfds_select_mitigation();
	srbds_select_mitigation();
	l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
	srso_select_mitigation();
	gds_select_mitigation();
	its_select_mitigation();
	bhi_select_mitigation();
	tsa_select_mitigation();
	vmscape_select_mitigation();

	/*
	 * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
	 * choices.
	 */
	spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
	/*
	 * retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by
	 * spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.
	 */
	retbleed_update_mitigation();
	/*
	 * its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()
	 * and retbleed_update_mitigation().
	 */
	its_update_mitigation();

	/*
	 * spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on
	 * retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP
	 * selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.
	 */
	spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();
	mds_update_mitigation();
	taa_update_mitigation();
	mmio_update_mitigation();
	rfds_update_mitigation();
	bhi_update_mitigation();
	/* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */
	srso_update_mitigation();
	vmscape_update_mitigation();

	spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
	retbleed_apply_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
	ssb_apply_mitigation();
	l1tf_apply_mitigation();
	mds_apply_mitigation();
	taa_apply_mitigation();
	mmio_apply_mitigation();
	rfds_apply_mitigation();
	srbds_apply_mitigation();
	srso_apply_mitigation();
	gds_apply_mitigation();
	its_apply_mitigation();
	bhi_apply_mitigation();
	tsa_apply_mitigation();
	vmscape_apply_mitigation();
}

/*
 * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM, since Intel uses
 * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for SSBD.
@@ -3371,6 +3231,99 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
}

void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
{
	/*
	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
	 */
	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
		rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);

		/*
		 * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
		 * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
		 * rediscover them based on configuration.
		 */
		x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
	}

	x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();

	cpu_print_attack_vectors();

	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
	retbleed_select_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
	ssb_select_mitigation();
	l1tf_select_mitigation();
	mds_select_mitigation();
	taa_select_mitigation();
	mmio_select_mitigation();
	rfds_select_mitigation();
	srbds_select_mitigation();
	l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
	srso_select_mitigation();
	gds_select_mitigation();
	its_select_mitigation();
	bhi_select_mitigation();
	tsa_select_mitigation();
	vmscape_select_mitigation();

	/*
	 * After mitigations are selected, some may need to update their
	 * choices.
	 */
	spectre_v2_update_mitigation();
	/*
	 * retbleed_update_mitigation() relies on the state set by
	 * spectre_v2_update_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.
	 */
	retbleed_update_mitigation();
	/*
	 * its_update_mitigation() depends on spectre_v2_update_mitigation()
	 * and retbleed_update_mitigation().
	 */
	its_update_mitigation();

	/*
	 * spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation() depends on
	 * retbleed_update_mitigation(), specifically the STIBP
	 * selection is forced for UNRET or IBPB.
	 */
	spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation();
	mds_update_mitigation();
	taa_update_mitigation();
	mmio_update_mitigation();
	rfds_update_mitigation();
	bhi_update_mitigation();
	/* srso_update_mitigation() depends on retbleed_update_mitigation(). */
	srso_update_mitigation();
	vmscape_update_mitigation();

	spectre_v1_apply_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_apply_mitigation();
	retbleed_apply_mitigation();
	spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation();
	ssb_apply_mitigation();
	l1tf_apply_mitigation();
	mds_apply_mitigation();
	taa_apply_mitigation();
	mmio_apply_mitigation();
	rfds_apply_mitigation();
	srbds_apply_mitigation();
	srso_apply_mitigation();
	gds_apply_mitigation();
	its_apply_mitigation();
	bhi_apply_mitigation();
	tsa_apply_mitigation();
	vmscape_apply_mitigation();
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS

#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
+0 −9
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -42,15 +42,6 @@ extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
			    *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];

#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
enum tsx_ctrl_states {
	TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
	TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
	TSX_CTRL_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT,
	TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED,
};

extern __ro_after_init enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state;

extern void __init tsx_init(void);
void tsx_ap_init(void);
void intel_unlock_cpuid_leafs(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+33 −25
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -19,7 +19,17 @@
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tsx: " fmt

enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state __ro_after_init = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
enum tsx_ctrl_states {
	TSX_CTRL_AUTO,
	TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
	TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
	TSX_CTRL_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT,
	TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED,
};

static enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state __ro_after_init =
	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO) ? TSX_CTRL_AUTO   :
	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF) ? TSX_CTRL_DISABLE : TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;

static void tsx_disable(void)
{
@@ -156,11 +166,28 @@ static void tsx_dev_mode_disable(void)
	}
}

void __init tsx_init(void)
static int __init tsx_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
	char arg[5] = {};
	int ret;
	if (!str)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (!strcmp(str, "on")) {
		tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
	} else if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
		tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
	} else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) {
		tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_AUTO;
	} else {
		tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
		pr_err("invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
	}

	return 0;
}
early_param("tsx", tsx_parse_cmdline);

void __init tsx_init(void)
{
	tsx_dev_mode_disable();

	/*
@@ -194,27 +221,8 @@ void __init tsx_init(void)
		return;
	}

	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));
	if (ret >= 0) {
		if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto")) {
	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_AUTO)
		tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
		} else {
			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
			pr_err("invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
		}
	} else {
		/* tsx= not provided */
		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO))
			tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF))
			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
		else
			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
	}

	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE) {
		tsx_disable();